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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. COLMAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
A. J. BUTKOVICH and GENEVA A. 
BUTKOVICH, husband and wife; G 
W. ANDERSON and JEANNE D. 
BANKS, and all unknown piefrsons 
who claim any interest in the subject 
matter of this action, 
Defendants-Appellants. J 
Case No. 
13868 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Because Respondent has chosen to ignore the fatal 
defects in his title to the property involved in this action, 
but instead has claimed the benefit of the Marketable 
Record Title Act, and challenged the adequacy of Appel-
lants' title, Appellants deem it necssary to file this reply 
to the new issues raised in Respondent's Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants reaffirm their statement of facts in their 
initial brief and make the following ckrifications of asser-
tions made in Respondent's statement of facts: 
On page 4 of Respondent's Brief it is asserted that 
the property described on the Warranty Deed from Rob-
ert T. Banks to WUiam J. Colman "had been vested in 
1916 in The Assets Corporation and in Park City Town-
site," presumably referring to the Park City Townsite 
Company. This statement is untrue since The Assets 
Corporation never had any more than a one-fifth interest 
in "the Park City Townsite" which is not the same de-
scription in the deed to Colman (See Ex. 11A). Further-
more, the Park City Townsite Company received a de-
fective Sheriff's Deed, after a defective Sheriff's sale, 
which, in any event, was subject to all prior interests in 
the property that had not been conveyed. As pointed 
out on page 11 of Appellants' Brief there were prior un-
conveyed interests in the property which constituted 
defects in the title of these two corporations. 
Respondent further states on page 4 of his brief 
that "no other title claimant appears of record from 1916 
until the 1968 Warranty Deed to Pkintiff." This state-
ment, of course, ignores the Auditor's Tax Deeds to 
Summit County in 1915 and 1940 and the deeds from 
Summit County to Butkoviches in 1964 and 1965. 
Respondent again claims that his expert witness, 
Robert B. Jones, testified that he could not locate the 
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property described on the deeds to Butkoviches. How-
ever, when Jones was given the complete description 
on the deeds, he testified that the property could be lo-
cated (Tr. 33-34). See also Tr. 90-91 where it was es-
tablished without dispute that the initials "P. C." are a 
standard, well-known and commonly accepted designa-
tion for property in the Park City Townsite. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S RELIANCE UPON THE MAR-
KETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT IS MIS-
PLACED SINCE HE DOES NOT HAVE THE 
REQUIRED "UNBROKEN CHAIN OF TI-
TITLE OF RECORD" NOR IS THE BANKS' 
AFFIDAVIT A "TITLE TRANSACTION," 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO "COLOR OF TITLE" 
NOR "PRIMA FACIE" TITLE. 
Respondent's Brief claims that his tide is "direct" 
starting with a Sheriff's Dead to the Park City Townsite 
Company and a deed to The Assets Corporation in 1916. 
This starting point, of course, ignores the seven defects 
in the title leading up to those two deeds. These defects 
are listed on pages 11 and 12 of Appellants' Brief. 
Plaintiff then assarts that the 1968 affidavit of Rob-
ert T. Banks "fully explains" how Banks received his 
interest in the property from the Park City Townsite 
Company and The Assets Corporation. Far from being 
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a document which "fully explains" this asserted transfer 
of interest, the Banks' affidavit 
1) states on its face that The Assets Corpora-
tion was only a part owner of the property, 
2) describes no real property but refers only 
to "the remaining assets of said Assets Cor-
poration,," 
3) is hearsay and therefore inadmissible to es-
tablish any of the facts which it asserts, 
4) is a self-serving recital incompetent as evi-
dence to establish title, State Road Commis-
sion v. Thompson, 17 U. 2d 412, 413 P. 2d 
603 (1966), 
5) assumes, incorrectly, that a resolution of 
one corporation to "take over the affairs" of 
another corporation may legally accomplish 
that take-over, 
6) is false and fraudulent, since it is contra-
dictory to the minutes of the directors' 
meeting of The Assets Corporation, to which 
it refers, and to Banks' own letter suggesting 
the fraud set forth in the affidavit, and 
7) is ineffective to convey or affect title to any 
real property, since it was not "entitled to 
recordation" without the legal description 
of the real property allegedly affected there-
by. § 57-3-10, U. C. A., Crompton v. Jen-
son, 78 Utah 55, 1 P. 2d 242, 244 (1931). 
This affidavit, upon which Colman vests his entire 
claim to title, has abosluateiy no effect to establish title 
in anyone. It certainly is not the "prima facie evidence" 
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of title claimed by Colman in his brief. Prima facie title 
"is shown by a grant from someone who held possession, 
or by such grant and possession under it by the grantee 
. . . " Music Service Corporation v. Walton, 20 U. 2d 16> 
432 P. 2d 334, 336 (1967). Since Colman failed to show 
possession by himself or his grantor, he has failed to 
establish a prima facie title and his complaint should 
have been dismissed. 
Colman claims, on page 15 of his brief, that he has 
"an unbroken chain of title of record" to the property 
for over forty years as required by the Marketable Rec-
ord Title Act. He has obviously misread that Act and, 
therefore, the pertinent sections thereof are set out in 
full: 
Section 57-9-1, U. C, A. 
Any person having the legal capacity to own 
land in this state, who has an unbroken chain 
of title of record to any interest in land for forty 
years or more, shall be deemed to have a market-
able record title to such interest as defined in 
section 57-9-8, subject only to the matters stated 
in section 57-9-2. A person shall be deemed to 
have such an unbroken chain of title when the 
official public records disclose a conveyance or 
other title transaction, of record not less than 
forty years at the time the marketability is to 
be determined, which said conveyance or other 
title faransaction purports to create such interest, 
either in 
(1) the person claiming such interest or 
(2) some ofcher person from whom, by one 
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or more conveyances or other title transactions 
of record, such purported interest has become 
vested in the person claiming such interest: 
with nothing appearing of record, in either case, 
purporting to divest such claimant of such pur-
ported interest. 
To claim the benefit of the Marketable Record Title 
Act Colman must prove a conveyance to him more 
than forty years ago or one or more conveyances or "other 
title transactions" of record to him from some other per-
son to whom a conveyance was made more than forty 
years ago, with nothing appearing of record "purporting 
to divest" Colman of his purported interest. Since the 
deed to him was not made more than forty years ago, 
he must rely on the second alternative. Obviously, the 
affidavit of Banks is not a conveyance but is it a "title 
transaction" within the terms of the statute? This phrase 
is defined by the statute as follows: 
Section 57-9-8(6), U. C. A. 
The words "title transaction" mean any 
transaction affecting title to any interest in land,, 
including title by will or descent, title by tax 
deed, or by trustee's, referee's, guardian's, exe-
cutor's, administrator's, master in chancery's, or 
sheriff's deed, or decree of any court, as well as 
warranty deed, quitclaim deed, or mortgage. 
This definition limits the term "title transaction" to 
various kinds of deeds and probate proceedings, all of 
which are effective to pass title to real property. The 
phrase in the definition referring to "any transaction 
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affecting title" can certainly not include the Bank's affi-
davit, even if it were accepted at face value. This Court 
has held such hearsay and self-serving documents com-
pletely ineffective to convey any interest in property. 
State Road Commission v. Thompson, 17 U. 2d 412, 416 
P. 2d 603 (1966). The affidavit, therefore, clearly has 
no effect upon the title. To claim that the ex parte, 
self-serving, false and hearsay affidavit of Banks is a 
"title transaction" within the terms of the Marketable 
Record Title Act, as Colman claims, is asking this Court 
to close its eyes to reality and integrity. 
Furthermore, Colman has no unbroken chain of title 
of record because there are documents appearing of rec-
ord "purporting to divest" the interest of his predecessors, 
namely, the Auditor's Tax Deeds to Summit County and 
the deeds from Summit County to the Butkoviches. 
These recorded documents, according to § 57-9-1, U. C. 
A., deprive Colman of his unbroken chain of title of rec-
ord, and, therefore, Colman has no marketable record 
title. However, even if he had a marketable record title, 
the Act makes such title expressly subject to the matters 
in § 57-9-2, the applicable provisions of which are: 
Section 57-9-2, II. C, A. 
The marketable record title shall be subject 
to: 
(1) All interests and defects which are in-
herent in the muniments of which such chain of 
record title is formed; , , 
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(4) Any interest arising out of a title tran-
saction which has been recorded subsequent to 
the effective date of the root of title from which 
the unbroken chain of title of record is started; 
This section would make Colman's title, assuming 
he had title, subject to the tax title of the Butkoviches, 
since the tax title is an "interest arising out of a title 
transaction which has been recorded subsequent" to the 
root of title. Ctolman's title would further be subject to 
"all interests and defects which are inherent in the muni-
ments" forming his chain of record; that is, all interests 
and defects in the Banks' affidavit upon which Colman 
relies. See the list of defects in that affidavit on page 
4, above. 
The discussion on page 17 of Respondent's Brief con-
cerning documents "purporting to divest" pursuant to 
§ 57-9-1, U. C. A., attempts to show that the deed from 
Banks to Colman purports to divest the grantor's title 
and, therefore, Colman must have title. No one will 
argue that the deed from Banks to Colman divests Banks 
of whatever title he had. Since Banks had no title to 
convey, Colman has a cause of action against Banks, or 
his estate^ under the warranties in his deed. However, 
Colman has completely misread the Marketable Record 
Title Act because it provides that any document "pur-
porting to divest" title prevents a marketable record 
title from arising. Therefore, Colman's argument that his 
deed purports to divest title from his grantor defeats his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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own claim to the benefits of the Marketable Reco(rd Title 
Act. The deed to him is in fact a "wild deed," since his 
grantor nowhere appears in the chain of tittle, and is 
therefore ineffective to convey any title. 
POINT II. 
THE VALIDITY OF APPELLANTS' TAX 
TITLE IS NOT RELEVANT IN THIS PRO-
CEEDING. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR TAX 
TITLE IS VALID AND THEIR PROPERTY 
DESCRIPTION IS ADEQUATE. 
In Point I of Appellants' initial brief it was estab-
lished that Colman, as plaintiff, could prevail in this case 
only on the strength of his own title and not on any 
weakness of defendants'. It was further established that 
Colman had no standing to challenge the tax title of 
Butkoviiches even if that tax title might be defective. 
Nevertheless, Colman ignores all of the cases and the 
long established law on these points, and then proceeds 
to challenge the validity of the tax title. His sole claim 
of authority for this tack is dictum from Huntington City 
v. Peterson, 30 U. 2d 407, 518 P. 2d 1246 (1974). Con-
trary to Colman's claim, that case does not stand for 
the proposition that the burden is on the tax title holder 
to establish his title by showing the regularity of all tax 
proceedings. That case held that the tax assessment and 
levy were not made prior to the time the tax-exempt 
city acquired titles therefore the tax assessment was in-
valid and the tax sale and tax deed were void. That was 
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the only ground upon which the plaintiff challenged the 
defendants' tax title. Furthermore, the plaintiff in that 
case first established its own title before challenging the 
defendants' tax title. In the case now before this Court 
the plaintiff, Colman, has not established his own title 
and therefore has no standing to challenge the defen-
dants' title. 
To further emphasize Colman's burden to prove his 
own title, rather than just claim that his title is better 
than the tax title, it should be noted that the plaintiff 
in a quiet title action cannot prevail, even when all de-
fendants are in default, unless he produces evidence of 
his title and possession. Section 78-40-13, U. C. A., re-
quires such evidence to be produced, even where a default 
judgment is sought, and requires the Court to "enter 
judgment in accordance with the evidence and the law." 
Colman must affirmatively establish his title and, having 
failed to do so, would not even be entitled to a default 
judgment. 
In challenging the adequacy of the description in 
the tax title involved here, Colman relies on several cases, 
all of which involve legal descriptions that applied to 
more than one parcel of land or to land that was non-
existent. In Edwards v. City of Santa Paula, 292 P. 2d 
31, 36 (Calif., 1956), the property was described as Lots 
20 to 31 "being a portion of Lot 14, Block 68, City of 
Santa Paula, Map No. 20." The problem existed be-
cause there were two maps of that designation, one of 
which showed a Lot 14 "so placed and of such a size that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lots 20 to 31 could not possibly be parts of it," and the 
other of which showed two bits numbered 14, neither of 
which could contains lots 20 to 31. The description being 
impossible to locate, the deed was held to be defective. 
In Meyerkort v. Warrington, 19 So. 2d 433 (Miss. 
1944), the description was "Pt. Sec. 28 Tp, 12 R. 3 E," 
with other parcels similarly described. With no indica-
tion as to whether the township is North or South and 
no designation of which pari: of the section was intended, 
this description obviously could not be located. The same 
defect, that is, failure to designate the township and 
range, resulted in a defective title in Burton v. Hoover, 
93 Utah 498, 74 P. 2d 652 (1937). That case, however, 
has been limited by the later case of Keller v. Chournos, 
102 Utah 535, 133 P. 2d 318 (1943), which considered 
the failure to designate the township "North" and the 
range "West" not fatal where the location in Box Elder 
County must of necessity be "North" and "West". The 
court took judicial notice of such facts. 
The description here, property in Summit County, 
Utah, to wit: "all unplatted land in this Block (29 P. C.) 
and all land West of this Blk." with reference to the sale 
for delinquent taxes against the prior owners, D. C. 
McLaughlin Estate and Park City Townsite, refers to 
only one possible tract of land. The designation "P. C." 
is a standard, well-known abbreviation for property in 
the Park City Townsite in Summit County (Tr. 90-91), 
and such abbreviations "having local significance" are 
authorized by § 59-11-6, U. C. A. This property descrip-
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tion does not run West "to the Pacific Ocean, to the West 
line of Utah, Summit County or to the summit of the 
next mountain" as Colman so facetiously suggests. It 
obviously runs to the West boundary of the Park City 
Townsiite. There is only one black 29 in the Park City 
Townsite and only one Park City Townsiite in Summit 
County, Utah. Ownership in all the property West of 
the Park City Townsite was in the United States Gov-
ernment and was therefore not assessed (Tr. 88-90). 
There were no surrounding landowners to be confused by 
this description. It could not apply to any other land. 
Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah 442, 85 P. 2d 827 (1938), 
relied upon by Colman, held the description of the prop-
erty involved to be sufficient and not misleading and 
relied upon tesitimony of numerous witnesses that the 
alleged faults in the description were common parlance 
and that there was no other land in the County to which 
the description would apply. This is also true here. Fur-
ther, the quotation on pages 6 and 7 of Respondent's 
Brief from Edwards v. City of Santa Paula, above, con-
veniently omitted the following from the middle of the 
quotation, without any indication of the omission: 
"If the land is described by some name or desig-
nation, evidence will be received for the purpose 
of showing that the tract in controversy was 
well and generally known by that name or des-
ignation." 
Under Colman's own authorities the tax title de-
scription in tins case must be considered adequate and 
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valid. No one was misled or confused. Colman's pre-
decessors in title have not paid any taxes on this prop-
erty at least since 1935! Surely they did not expect this 
property to be free of the taxes all other landowners are 
required to pay to preserve their ownership! They knew 
that it would have been sold for taxes and should not be 
allowed to come in at this late date to attempt recon-
struction of their title by fraud and challenge the validity 
of the County's tax title. This was certainly one of the 
motivating factors behind the statutes of limitations in 
sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, U. C. A., barring any 
challenge after four yeara. See Point II of Appellants' 
Brief. These limitations statutes apply whether the tax 
title is valid or not. § 78-12-5.3, U. C. A. It is interesting 
that all of the cases relied upon by Colman were decided 
long before the passage of these limitations statutes and 
he is therefore left to rely upon ancient rulings super-
ceded by modern statutes and cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the numerous defects in plaintiff's claim 
of title, he had no title and therefore no standing to chal-
lenge the title of defendants. His reliance upon the Mar-
ketable Record Title Act is without merit since the Banks' 
affidavit is not a "title transaction" and he does not 
have an "unbroken chain of title of record." He does 
not have a prima fade title because he failed to show a 
conveyance from the record holder or possession in him-
self or his grantor. His challenge of the adequacy of 
the defendants' tax title was barred by the statutes of 
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limitations and by his lack of standing. Furthermore, the 
tax title description was adequate because it could apply 
to only one piece of property. Neither the record owner 
nor anyone else was confused or misled by that descrip-
tion. Therefore, the decree quieting title in plaintiff 
should be reversed and title to the property in dispute 
should be quieted in defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorney for Appellants 
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